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Duong, M.D. v. Fielden Hanson Isaacs Miyada Robinson Yeh, LTD., 136 Nev. Adv. Op. 87
(Dec. 31, 2020)1
BLUE-PENCILING OF A NONCOMPETITION AGREEMENT
Summary
The Nevada Supreme Court considered whether the district court may blue-pencil an
otherwise unenforceable noncompetition agreement, which included a provision authorizing the
court to remedy unreasonably restrictive clauses. The Court previously held in Golden Road that
a district court cannot on its own volition blue-pencil an unreasonably restrictive provision.2
However, the Court held that Golden Road does not prohibit a district court from blue-penciling
an unreasonable provision when the agreement itself allows the court to do so. Thus, the Court
affirmed the district court’s order granting the preliminary injunction, because the agreement at
issue had a provision that allowed for a court to blue-pencil unreasonable provisions.
Background
Appellants, Scott and Annie Duong, quit working for respondent, Fielden Hanson Isaacs
Miyada Robinson Yeh, LTD (“Fielden Hanson”), and began providing services to other surgeons
in Clark County after they had signed an employment contract that included a noncompetition
clause that prohibited the Duongs from working at certain facilities. The agreement contained a
blue-pencilling provision that allowed a court to change the provision of the agreement to make
it enforceable, if that provision was deemed to be unreasonable by a court.
After the Duongs began working at other facilities, Fielden Hanson alleged they violated
the noncompetition clause of their employment agreement and filed a complaint to enforce the
agreement and a motion for preliminary injunction. The Duongs countered by arguing that the
noncompetition clause was unreasonable and thus, unenforceable under Golden Road, and that
NRS 613.195(5)3 was not applicable because the statute was not effective until after they signed
the agreement.
The district court blue-penciled the noncompetition agreement and granted the
preliminary injunction to enforce the blue-penciled agreement because it found that the
agreement was overbroad and unreasonable and that NRS 613.195(5)4 did apply.
Discussion
This appeal is not moot5
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Golden Road Motor Inn, Inc. v. Islam, 376 P.3d 151, 159 (Nev. 2016).
3
NEV. REV. STAT. 613.195(5) (requiring a court to revise an unreasonable covenant or provision to the extent that
the revision will make it enforceable).
4
Id.
5
A case is not moot if the court’s ruling will affect the legal rights of the parties. Boulet v. City of Las Vegas, 614
P.2d 8,9 (Nev. 1980); see NCAA v. Univ. of Nev., Reno, 624 P.2d 10, 11 (Nev. 1981) for further explanation of
mootness.
2

The Court first addressed whether the appeal is moot or not and determined that this
appeal is not moot. Although the preliminary injunction had since expired, Fielden Hanson is
seeking damages for the blue-penciled version of the noncompetition agreement being allegedly
violated by the Duongs. Therefore, for Fielden Hanson to have a legal basis to seek damages, the
Court must determine whether the district court had the authority to blue-pencil the
noncompetition agreement.
The district court had the authority to blue-pencil the unreasonable noncompetition agreement
The Court next examined whether the district court had the authority to blue-pencil the
noncompetition agreement and determined that the district court did have that authority. The
Duongs relied on Golden Road as the basis for their argument for the disallowance of the bluepenciling of the agreement. However, the Duongs’ reliance is misplaced because Golden Road
held that a district court could not blue-pencil an unreasonable provision on its own, not that a
court was prohibited from blue-penciling an unreasonable noncompetition provision based on the
parties’ agreement that allows for it.6
The Court explained that courts are not allowed to create private contracts.7 Further, the
noncompetition agreement that is at issue in Golden Road does not provide a basis for
invalidating the blue-penciling provision in the current agreement because there was no bluepenciling provision for the agreement in Golden Road.8
Thus, because the noncompetition agreement at issue here had a blue-penciling provision,
the district court had the discretion to blue-pencil the unreasonable agreement.
Conclusion
The Court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by blue-penciling
the unreasonable noncompetition agreement because the agreement had a provision authorizing
the court to do so. Thus, the Court affirmed the district court’s order granting the preliminary
injunction.
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Golden Road, 376 P.3d at 159.
Id. (citing Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc. v. Vronman, 489 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Ark. 1973)).
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Id. at 153.
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